Then all you have to do is wait for your refund! If you originally filed with PriorTax. Photo via Alan Cleaver on Flickr. This entry was posted on Thursday, February 28th, at pm and is filed under Taxes for Prior Years. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2. You can leave a response , or trackback from your own site.
If i was claimed as dependent on someones taxes for Im single with no children and make less than 10, Was the refund already added into equation or do i and can i file just for the refund after the fact by myself? Name required. Email will not be published required.
Client Login Create an Account. Blog Home. Posted by admin on February 28, May 7, at pm. May 12, at pm. These provisions are available to taxpayers at all income levels, but the benefits of some may be limited for the highest-income taxpayers by other tax provisions.
The first three provisions are considered part of the normal income tax system and, therefore, are not considered tax expenditures. The last provision, the child and dependent care tax credit, is contingent on employment and earnings, and is considered a tax expenditure.
Exemptions for the taxpayer have been in the tax code since the beginning of the individual income tax. Exemptions do not affect tax liability in the same way that tax credits do. Since , working taxpayers have been able to claim a nonrefundable tax credit for employment-related care expenses for children and other dependents. The credit rate is reduced as AGI rises the minimum credit rate is 20 percent.
Most taxpayers claiming the credit receive less than the maximum amount of the credit. Since this credit is nonrefundable, working taxpayers with no tax liability cannot claim the credit. The first is simplicity and convenience—the provision should be clearly stated, not arbitrary, and minimize the inconvenience of filing the tax return. The second criterion is efficiency—the extent to which the provision adds or removes economic distortions. Whether or not a tax incentive achieves its objective, such as increasing work effort, can be considered a question of efficiency.
Lastly, a provision should be judged on equity—how the benefit or burden of the provision is distributed among taxpayers, and how it changes the distribution of the overall tax burden. As Congress has increasingly used the tax code to pursue policy goals, tax returns have become longer and more complex.
A taxpayer claiming the EITC must file the six-line Schedule EIC providing information on the qualifying children with her tax return and calculate the amount of the credit using a six-line worksheet. Claiming the CTC involves filing the line Schedule for the additional child tax credit and calculating the credit using a line worksheet. This paperwork burden entailed in claiming the EITC and the CTC is mitigated somewhat by the use of paid tax preparers or volunteer tax preparers, and electronic tax return filing.
Almost 80 percent of taxpayers filing the or A filed electronically in , and 60 percent used a paid or volunteer tax preparer IRS Earlier studies have estimated similar improper payment percentages for example, IRS However, EITC noncompliance studies have shown that the most common errors leading to overpayments involve unintentional misreporting of qualifying children McCubbin ; IRS Furthermore, the noncompliance studies do not take into account underpayments.
It is easy to understand how these unintentional errors occur. The criteria for qualifying children vary among different tax provisions. The IRS has prepared a three-page table listing the qualifying child criteria for the EITC, CTC, dependent exemption, head of household filing status, and the child and dependent care credit.
Most taxpayers with children take advantage of two or more of these tax provisions, and confusion is unavoidable when a child may be a qualifying child under one provision but not another. Taxes and tax provisions can change taxpayer behavior by introducing incentives or disincentives. By affecting the after-tax wage rate, these tax credits can affect labor supply or work effort, although the effect is theoretically ambiguous. A higher after-tax wage due to, say, a tax reduction increases the price of leisure.
This would lead an individual to take or purchase less leisure, or work more. This is known as the substitution effect. This is known as the income effect. Consequently, the total effect is ambiguous. The after-tax wage rate for working one more hour is the hourly wage multiplied by one minus the marginal tax rate. For most workers, the marginal income tax rate is either 10 percent, 15 percent, or 25 percent. Figure A shows the marginal tax rate of married workers with two children as annual earnings increase.
The marginal tax rate varies from minus 55 percent as the tax credits phase in to plus 36 percent as the EITC phases out. In the phase-in range, the after-tax wage is 55 percent higher than the before-tax wage rate, which provides an incentive to increase labor supply either to begin working or work more hours.
In the phase-out range, the after-tax wage rate is 36 percent lower than the before-tax wage rate and provides an incentive to work less that is, reduce labor supply. Since its inception, numerous studies have examined the labor supply effects of the earned income tax credit reviewed in Hotz and Scholz ; Eissa and Hoynes a; and Meyer Most studies focus on single mothers and find that the EITC increases labor force participation that is, induces single mothers to find a job.
But for those already working, there is mixed evidence that the EITC significantly affects the number of hours worked. Chetty, Friedman, and Saez forthcoming find that workers with children increase their hours of work in the EITC phase-in range, but do not substantially change their hours in the phase-out range.
This suggests that the high marginal tax rates associated with the EITC phase out have limited work disincentive effects. A few studies examine the EITC and the labor supply of married taxpayers. Overall, this research indicates that the EITC has a positive labor supply effect; it increases labor force participation with little or no effect on hours worked. The high marginal tax rate in the EITC phase-out range has no apparent effect on labor supply.
Most research that has examined the tax effects on marriage conclude that the tax credits have not affected marriage patterns reviewed in Hotz and Scholz Evidence suggests that the tax credits, however, may have small positive incentive effects on fertility reviewed in Hotz and Scholz The two tax credits are designed to increase the after-tax income of low- and moderate-income individuals and families, especially those with children.
Since the credits redistribute income, they can be judged on their effect on poverty, tax progressivity, and after-tax income inequality. These tax credits can be thought of as government transfers, part of which is used to pay income tax liability the nonrefundable part and the rest available for consumption or saving the refundable part. Over half of the individuals moved above the poverty threshold were children. The effect of the two tax credits on poverty is not uniform; it varies by family size.
Table 3 reports the before- and after-tax poverty rates of taxpayers receiving the EITC or the CTC, by tax filing status and number of qualifying children.
The after-tax incomes of these two groups leave even greater percentages in poverty. These after-tax poverty rates undoubtedly would have been higher without the EITC, but for these taxpayers the credit does little to offset income and payroll taxes. On the other hand, taxpayers with qualifying children married or single experience a reduction in poverty rates due to the EITC and CTC. For some of these taxpayers, the two credits together more than offset income and payroll taxes to raise living standards.
Note: State taxes and income from means-tested public assistance are not included in the analysis. As would be expected given the effect on poverty, the tax benefits of the credits are progressively distributed, as measured by the Suits index. The Suits index is negative if the benefits are predominately received by taxpayers in the upper part of the income distribution.
It is positive if the benefits are predominately received by those in the lower part of the distribution. The estimated Suits index for the child tax credit is 0. The effect on income inequality can be measured by the Gini coefficient, which varies from 0 to 1. A Gini coefficient of 0 indicates that income is evenly distributed among the population that is, everyone has the same income , while a value of 1 indicates perfect income inequality that is, one individual has all the income.
Some of the key provisions to address the drawbacks of the two credits are discussed. One vein of policy proposals would create two tax credits—a family credit and a work credit—by combining several work- and family-related tax provisions, such as the standard deduction, personal exemptions, the EITC, and the CTC. The family credit would combine the standard deduction, personal exemptions, head of household filing status, and the nonrefundable part of the CTC.
The work credit would be based on earnings. This proposal would simplify the tax code by combining overlapping provisions that have different rules. Since the two credits would be available to all taxpayers with no phase out, any work disincentive would be avoided. Others would make adjustments to EITC parameters to make the credit more neutral with respect to marital status and number of children.
Many of the proposals tinker with the phase-in range, the credit rate, and the phase-out range to reduce the penalty on workers as they earn higher wages though as previously noted, the high marginal tax rate in the phase-out range does not appear to produce a work disincentive.
Increasing the starting point of the phase out could also reduce any negative labor supply effects that may exist. Other proposals suggest adding benefits for each additional child, in order to reduce poverty for larger families currently a limit exists on the number of children a family can benefit from through these credits. Finally, there are proposals to expand benefits for childless workers, who under current law are the sole group that the federal tax system taxes deeper into poverty.
These reforms include lowering the eligibility age for childless workers, raising the maximum credit and the phase-in rate, and raising the earnings level at which the credit is fully phased in. What follows is a look at some of those reforms, in chronological order. Cherry and Sawicky propose a number of reforms to the EITC to address some of the issues that have dogged the EITC over its lifetime, such as its high implicit marginal tax rate in the phase-out range, the possibility of a marriage penalty, and finally, its complexity.
This unified credit would combine the EITC, the CTC, and an Additional Child Credit, and would be available to all taxpayers with children and earned income, thus considerably increasing the eligibility for the credit.
In , President Bush created an advisory panel to recommend options to simplify the tax code, as well as make it fairer and more conducive to economic growth. The purpose of consolidating the existing exemptions and credits into a family credit and a work credit was to replicate—but not improve upon—the existing distribution of tax burdens while greatly simplifying the tax structure and improving the compliance of refundable credits.
First, however, he noted the benefits of increasing the EITC for families with three or more children—a policy that currently exists though is scheduled to expire in Furman noted that expanding the EITC for families with at least three children would be a well-targeted policy that would benefit about three million families, and stated that these families are among those most likely to be in poverty.
The child tax credit would be refundable up to 34 percent of earnings for someone with one child, and up to 50 percent of earnings for someone with three or more children. He suggests that a separate work credit would be based on this framework, and include a childless EITC.
While the Fiscal Commission did not propose reforms to the EITC or the CTC, its plan is notable for leaving in place those policies while reforming or zeroing out other parts of the tax code that provide benefits to taxpayers largely known as tax expenditures.
The report cites a number of reasons to do so aside from simplicity, including that the EITC can both create a marriage penalty and can discourage work among those with incomes in the phase-out range.
The task force proposed replacing low-income tax provisions including the Personal Exemption for Children, the Child Tax Credit, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Child and Dependent Care Credit with two separate provisions: a universal child credit and an earnings credit. Taxpayers would file for the credit with each additional child; thereafter, receipt of the credit would be automatic until the children reach adulthood, as long as they reside in the household and attend school.
The earnings credit would be provided to working individuals through automatic adjustments made to withholding workers with one job would need to make no subsequent adjustments upon filing a tax return. The credit would not phase out; as the Bipartisan Policy Center argues, this would avoid the marriage penalty and the work disincentive.
In their place, EPI proposes implementing both a work credit and a family credit. This credit would not phase out at any income level and is designed to be fully refundable. A recent Center on Budget and Policy Priorities report Marr, Ruffini, and Huang estimates that such a reform package, as put forward in these bills, would lift more than , childless workers out of poverty, and significantly reduce the severity of poverty for almost four million more workers.
Furthermore, such an expanded credit could help meet challenges faced particularly by younger, less-educated people. These include low labor force participation rates, low marriage rates, and even high incarceration rates. While H. Additionally, the credit would phase down at a Funding from the Peter G. Peterson Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Thomas L. Hungerford joined the Economic Policy Institute in He has a Ph.
Rebecca Thiess joined the Economic Policy Institute in as a federal budget policy analyst. Her areas of research include federal budget and tax policy, retirement security, and public investment.
See Cook for a media report about these recent attacks. See Lampman for a discussion of FAP. Long wanted a work-oriented tax program to move welfare recipients into paid employment, and the NWRO wanted a higher income floor. In comparison, Form in was a single-page, nine-line form for most taxpayers. The instruction booklet was four pages.
The substitution effect of a price change is the change in demand for the good when relative prices change, holding utility constant i.
See, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer The income effect is the change in demand for the good allowing for the change in utility due to the income change, holding relative prices at the new level. It is often difficult to determine who is the primary wage earner and who is the secondary wage earner in a dual-worker household. Income from public means-tested transfers is not considered in the analysis.
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